Let’s consider how this goes in his article “Misrepresentation,” which Dretske takes the notion of meaningn to be a plausible starting point for. Frederick Irwin “Fred” Dretske was an American philosopher noted for his contributions to . carry information. This is how misrepresentation enters the world. Dretske – Misrepresentation. Uploaded by nmoverley. Philosophy Dretske Misrepresentation Writing. Copyright: © All Rights Reserved. Download as PDF, TXT.
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If, as in our previous example, we think of the meaning n of R in this case as some disjunctive property, then since the disjunctive property in question will change as the creature adds to the properties to which it is sensitive, the meaning n of R will misrepresentarion change over time.
Codgitator Cadgertator August 20, at 1: The question of a fish’s discomfort in a curved bowl has no bearing on giving it a false or accurate picture of the world, since “the world” is itself an abstract notion beyond sense cognition pleasant or otherwise.
Any of these would be a plausible candidate for the function of the sensory states in question. Posted by Edward Feser at 9: Nonetheless, R will still be a reliable indicator of the tree over time, and thus mean n that a tree of such-and-such a sort is present over time. Feser, much “Catholic dogma,” to admit non-human animals don’t have language. Philosophy of mind Epistemology. Does Dretske allude to Peirce at all? Misrepresentation has, therefore, still not been explained naturalistically.
But seriously, the convoluted A-T misrepresentagion I just read is out of sync with our modern understanding of cognition. It seems with all animal research, the difficulty of their task seems to foster a bit of disillusionment over a lifetime.
Just Thinking August 18, at 4: And that would entail that, if we thought of dretskf function of R as the detection of this disjunctive property, then that function, and thus the meaning f of R, would also change over time.
In order to deal with this problem, Dretske, again like other contemporary naturalists, appeals to the notion of function. Misre;resentation problem is that it is not obvious how it accounts for meaning where biological need is not in question, though Dretske thinks the account might be extendable in a way that does account for such cases.
The skeptic’s alternatives fall into this irrelevant category. We also need to note the difference between intellect on the one hand and sensation and imagination on the other, and the unique situation our having both material and immaterial aspects of our nature puts us in. Angels cannot err with respect to natural things, and this has to do with the different way in which the know things, given that unlike us they are pure intellects.
Just Thinking August 18, at 8: I was thinking more like putting a prisoner in a dretskf where the most offensive sme;;s and horrid sounds are continuously assaulting the senses. Hence, bringing up Hume is a fallacy of equivocation, since Hume didn’t think humans made “judgments” in the Scholastic sense.
Fred Dretske – Wikipedia
When it has either an internal sensory state I 1 which means n that the leaf pattern is present, or an internal state I 2 which means n that the bark is present, the creature will go into a further state R that leads it to run away. The following applies RAT to Johns oatmeal:.
It was Descartes’ theory of mind, after all, not the classical and Scholastic theory, which portrayed animals as sensless meat machines. To combat this attack by the skeptic, Dretske develops relevant alternatives theory RAT. You may not like it, but it is a powerful argument from analogy — an especially useful form of argument given the subjective nature of the issue.
So, if a thought is as material as a word token or a picture is for example, if it is identical to a brain processwhat explains the fact that it has intrinsic intentionality while they lack it? And unless you speak of him in the third person, you never quite provoke him into telling you. Can you argue your misreprwsentation, or is it a matter of faith in Misrepreswntation dogma? Benson – – Synthese 80 1: He is certainly not alone among researchers in his views on animal cognition.
Codgitator Cadgertator August 18, at 6: The denial of epistemic closure is rejected by many philosophers who regard the principle as intuitive. I wonder miwrepresentation historians will look at our epoch of blogging and note its cause was shown to be a collective cultural keyboard fetish. Now R itself in this case does not mean n either that the leaf pattern is present or that the bark is present, because there is no regular correlation between either one of those, specifically, and R; either one could cause R.
Dretske Misrepresentation Notes
Epistemic misreprwsentation does not hold if one does not know all of the known entailments of a knowledge claim. Find it on Scholar. Indeed, it is often the case that entis rationis cause as much grief in human cognition as they provide for essential detske ‘superiority’, so to speak.
Comrade shooosh, geese and golden eggs. It also entails not eating scrambled eggs while being deceived by an evil demon into believing one is eating oatmeal.
For the meaning — the content — of a belief to explain an action, on this view, is for the content of the belief to explain why it is that the mental state is part of dretwke process that leads to the movement it does.
Edward Feser August 17, at 6: God and angels do not know things in that manner.
I’m perusing his more recent posts in this vein on Chomsky, Stoljar, Fodor before commenting on this post. For if a materialist tries to solve the problem in question by postulating such ends or purposes as a way of explaining how R can have a determinate function, then he has thereby ceased to be a materialist and returned to a more or less Aristotelian or Scholastic conception of nature.
Just Thinking August 18, at 3: Insofar as things are formally activated matter, they have an inherent intelligibility which is activated intentionally by the intellect on the basis of abstraction from phantasms.